四川省阿坝藏族羌族自治州人民政府


阿坝州人民政府关于印发四川省灾后恢复重建对口支援省市援助建设形成的国有资产管理暂行办法的通知

阿府发〔2010〕15号


各县人民政府，州直各部门，卧龙管理局：

　　现将《四川省灾后恢复重建对口支援省市援助建设形成的国有资产管理暂行办法》印发你们，请认真遵照执行。采取有效措施切实做好灾后恢复重建对口支援省市援助我州建设形成的国有资产竣工验收、移交、使用及管理工作，保障对口支援资产的安全完整、保值增值，防止国有资产流失。

　　特此通知。

二○一○年九月二十七日

四川省人民政府
关于印发四川省灾后恢复重建对口支援
省市援助建设形成的国有资产管理
暂行办法的通知

川府发〔2010〕25号


各市（州）人民政府，省政府各部门、各直属机构：

　　《四川省灾后恢复重建对口支援省市援助建设形成的国有资产管理暂行办法》已经省政府同意，现予印发，请认真遵照执行。

四川省人民政府

二○一○年九月八日

四川省灾后恢复重建对口支援省市
援助建设形成的国有资产管理暂行办法

第一章 总则

　　第一条 为做好灾后恢复重建对口支援省市援助我省建设形成的国有资产（以下简称“对口支援资产”）竣工验收、移交、使用及管理等工作，保障对口支援资产的安全完整、保值增值，防止国有资产流失，根据财政部《行政单位国有资产管理暂行办法》（财政部令第35号）、《事业单位国有资产管理暂行办法》（财政部令第36号）、《关于修订〈企业国有资产产权登记管理办法实施细则〉的通知》（财管字〔2000〕116号）、国务院《企业国有资产产权登记管理办法》(国务院令第192号)等相关法规制度，结合灾后恢复重建对口支援工作实际，特制定本办法。

　　第二条 本办法所称对口支援资产，是指在汶川地震灾后恢复重建中对口支援省市（含内蒙古自治区、海南省及省内13个对口支援市州，下同）按照国家和支援、受援双方有关规定，以提供实物资产、援建资金或以提供实物资产及援建资金相结合等各种形式投资、建设形成的行政事业单位资产和企业国有资产。

第二章 对口支援资产的接收和产权登记

　　第三条 对口支援资产由受援县（市、区）人民政府统一接收。受援县（市、区）人民政府国有资产管理职能部门（指财政部门和国资监管部门，下同）代表受援县（市、区）、乡（镇）人民政府组织相关部门，配合对口支援省（市）做好对口支援资产的验收交接，并负责监督相关部门开展接收和产权登记工作。

　　第四条 对口支援资产的验收移交应严格按国家基本建设项目管理办法和相关法律法规的规定进行。项目完工后经支援、受援双方同意即可组织资产验收交接。资产验收交接应坚持先验收、再交接的原则。

　　第五条 受援县（市、区）接收对口支援资产应当进行产权登记。产权登记应严格遵守国有资产管理的有关政策，由受援县（市、区）国有资产管理职能部门组织实施。

　　第六条 接收使用对口支援资产的行政事业单位、国有企业应当向同级国有资产管理职能部门申请产权登记，并由国有资产管理职能部门制作和核发《对口支援资产产权登记证》。

　　《对口支援资产产权登记证》是对口支援资产接收部门（单位）接收占有、经营使用对口支援资产的法律凭证。

　　第七条 对口支援资产产权登记的内容主要包括：

　　（一）对口支援省（市）及其具体负责实施、建设的部门或市、县人民政府名称；

　　（二）接收时间；

　　（三）接收使用单位性质、主管部门，接收使用单位名称、住所、成立时间和负责人；

　　（四）接收使用对口支援资产名称、类别、数量和金额；

　　（五）其他需要登记的事项。

　　第八条 按照分类建档、集中管理的原则，各级国有资产管理职能部门应建立以下对口支援资产档案：

　　（一）对口支援资产接收的工程财务决算资料档案；

　　（二）对口支援资产配置(房屋建筑物、土地、汽车、专用机器设备等)档案；

　　（三）对口支援资产处置档案；

　　（四）房屋产权证、土地使用权证证件统一管理档案；

　　（五）对口支援资产管理中其他重要资料。

第三章 对口支援资产的审计和评估

　　第九条 接收的对口支援资产，按照国家规定符合审计条件的应当进行决算审计。已经对口支援省（市）审计的，审计结果作为移交资产、产权登记和入账管理的依据；未经对口支援省（市）审计的，以对口支援省（市）提供的竣工决算资料作为移交资产、产权登记和入账管理的依据。

　　由受援县（市、区）政府负责提供土地、道路、水电等配套工程和其他前期投资，或与其他资金打捆投资建设形成的非对口支援资金全额援建的资产，对口支援资产部分不能分割或不宜分割的，由受援县（市、区）与援建省市协商确定审计主体，实行统一审计、切块算账原则，审计结果应明确对口支援资产的金额。

　　第十条 接收的对口支援资产需要重新进行资产评估的，应委托依法设立的符合条件的资产评估机构进行，并在国有资产管理职能部门备案。

第四章 对口支援资产的使用维护

　　第十一条 具备生产条件的对口支援资产接收后应及时投入使用，发挥资产实效。需要受援地配备相关配套设施和提供外部使用条件的，受援县（市、区）人民政府和资产接收使用单位应提前作好准备，确保对口支援资产早日投入使用。

　　第十二条 接收对口支援资产的部门（单位）应事先掌握对口支援资产的使用技能和管理方法，对技术含量和单位价值高的大型机具、高精仪器等先进设备应配备专人使用维护管理。

　　第十三条 对口支援资产接收使用部门（单位）应发掘对口支援资产的使用潜力，保持维护资产功效和形象，延长资产使用寿命。经营性对口支援资产取得的收益，按“收支两条线”原则统一纳入财政预算管理后，可优先用于对口支援资产的继续运转、日常维护和升级更新。

　　第十四条 受援县（市、区）国有资产管理职能部门应掌握各接收单位对口支援资产的使用情况，对闲置、低效运转的对口支援资产提出调剂和处置的政策建议。

第五章 对口支援资产的管理与监督

　　第十五条 各受援县（市、区）政府国有资产管理职能部门代表受援县（市、区）政府、乡（镇）政府行使所辖对口支援资产管理职能。各受援县（市）政府国有资产管理职能部门的职责是：

　　（一）负责会同有关部门研究制定接收对口支援资产的办法，配合对口支援省（市）组织实施对口支援资产产权界定、资产审计评估、资产接收、产权登记、资产清查、资产统计报告等工作；

　　（二）调查研究对口支援资产管理工作中存在的问题，提出改进方案和政策措施，处理对口支援资产产权纠纷，按规定对产权变动、资产处置和利用对口支援资产对外投资、出租、出借和担保等事项进行审批；

　　（三）负责本级行政事业单位和企业经营性对口支援资产收益的监督、管理；

　　（四）负责了解和汇总对口支援资产的运行状况，并就对口支援资产运行需要建立必要的外部条件和完善相关配套设施的情况向同级政府提出建议意见，对闲置、低效运转的对口支援资产提出调剂和处置的建议；

　　（五）监督指导本级行政事业单位及相关部门的对口支援资产管理工作，并向本级政府报告对口支援资产管理工作。

　　第十六条 受援县（市、区）使用对口支援资产的部门（单位）主要职责是：

　　（一）依据本办法制定本部门（单位）接收对口支援资产管理的具体办法并组织实施；

　　（二）负责本部门（单位）对口支援资产的验收入库、账卡管理、会计核算、清查登记、维护保管、统计报告及日常监督检查等工作；

　　（三）配合同级国有资产管理职能部门做好本部门（单位）有关对口支援资产配置、处置以及利用对口支援资产进行对外投资、出租、出借和担保等事项的内部审核和管理，并按规定程序报批；

　　（四）负责接收的对口支援资产使用管理，做到物尽其用，充分发挥其使用效益，保障对口支援资产的安全完整、保值增值，防止使用中的不当损失和浪费，并按规定及时、足额缴纳对口支援资产收益；

　　（五）配合同级国有资产管理职能部门做好本部门（单位）对口支援资产管理和使用情况的评价考核；

　　（六）接受同级国有资产管理职能部门的监督、指导并向其报告有关对口支援资产管理工作。

　　第十七条 国有资产管理职能部门与接收使用对口支援资产的部门（单位）应当在国有资产管理信息系统中进一步完善对口支援资产管理信息，对对口支援资产实行动态管理。

　　第十八条 接收使用对口支援资产的国有企业和实行企业化管理并执行企业财务会计制度的事业单位以及事业单位创办的具有法人资格的企业，由同级国有资产管理职能部门按照企业国有资产管理的有关规定实施监督管理。

　　第十九条 各级国有资产管理职能部门、接收对口支援资产的部门（单位）应加强对对口支援资产管理和监督；坚持单位内部监督与财政监督、审计监督、社会监督相结合，事前监督、事中监督、事后监督相结合，日常监督和专项检查相结合。

　　第二十条 国有资产管理职能部门、主管部门、接收使用单位及其工作人员，擅自占有、使用、处置对口支援资产，以及在上缴、管理对口支援资产收益或下拨财政资金中有违规行为的，依据《财政违法行为处罚处分条例》的规定进行处理；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。

第六章 附则

　　第二十一条 对口支援资产移交行政事业单位占有、使用的，依法确认为国有资产，其管理按照国家和省行政事业单位资产管理的有关规定执行。对口支援资产移交企业占有、使用的，依法确认为国有资产，其管理按照国家和省企业资产管理的有关规定执行。

　　第二十二条 私人、企业和社会团体单独捐赠援建的资产根据资产实际使用单位性质及国家有关政策，符合国有资产管理规定的参照本办法执行。

　　第二十三条 非财政供给经费的社会团体和民办非企业单位中占有、使用对口支援资产的，参照本办法执行。

　　第二十四条 本办法由财政厅、省国资委负责解释。


Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System


Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:

“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”

In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”



【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.



List of References

1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.